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The interactions among Globalization, Democratic governance and Economic development 
have been a widely studied subject in the economy and political science literature. The 
empirical literature to date has typically focused on the links between pairwise combinations 
of the three variables of interest.  
For example, globalization is expected to support economic development and vice-versa. A 
nation’s resource endowments and its productivity determine the level of its income per 
capita, both in absolute terms and relative to the global frontier. Globalization, through trade, 
capital flows or migration can influence the effective level of endowments available in an 
economy, or through international technology transfers, its productivity. Conversely, a 
country’s endowments of natural resources, labor, and capital, as well as its geographic 
location and efficiency of its production structures may determine how much it trades with 
the rest of the world in terms of goods, services and assets.  
Similarly, a country with good democratic governance (rights and political liberties, high-
quality institutions, low levels of corruption and an effective government), and a flourishing 
civil society may likely increase the quality of its economic endowments. Once more, cause 
and effect can be swapped: well-endowed countries may evolve towards better governance 
more easily, or, at least, they may be able to afford investment in more resources to build 
well-functioning institutions. These interactions have been at the core of development 
economics. Acemoglu and Robinson (2012) collected evidence from many historical 
episodes worldwide showing that, while extractive societies may grow for a while, 
sustainable development requires inclusive institutions.  
Globalization interacts with democratic governance. Trade policy, competition by foreign 
producers and international investors, and openness-related differences in institution building 
costs are three major transmission mechanisms through which openness affects a country’s 
corruption levels. Bonaglia et al. (2011) summarise available theoretical explanations of 
causal relationships between globalization and governance and look at how trade openness 
improves the quality of domestic institutions in a sample of 119 countries during the period 
1984-98. They show that trade causes reductions in perceived corruption, suggesting one 
channel through which globalization can have positive governance-related spillovers1. 
Subsequent emphasis on inclusive institutions multiplied the possible channels. Eichengreen 
and Leblang (2008) confirmed a two-way interaction between democracy and globalization 
using a long-time period (from 1870 to 2000) and relying on binary measures of democracy 
                                               
1 In fact, after controlling for many cross-country differences, Braga de Macedo (2001) found that trade 
openness’ influence on corruption was close to that exercised by the level of development (proxied by income 
per capita). With the same sample as Bonaglia et al. (2011) and also using the ICRG index of perceived 
corruption and a parsimonious specification - which included import openness, per capita GDP and an index of 
political rights – he explained almost 50 per cent of the variability in the corruption index Moreover, a 10% 
increase in imports openness results in 0.03-point change in the corruption score. This is a sizeable effect, 
especially when compared to the 0.09-point changes due to a 10% increase in income per capita. 
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and of financial openness with less emphasis on institutions. However, as discussed above, 
the links between globalization and democratic governance cannot be separated from the 
effect of the level of development, as their interaction is always context-specific.   
The relation between democracy and development is perhaps the most controversial in 
economic and political science literature. The study of this interaction was pioneered by 
Lipset (1959), who posited that economic development was likely to favour a democratic 
system (the, so-called, ‘modernization theory’). Urbanisation brings increased literacy, media 
development and industrialization, which favours participatory institutions. Wealth permits 
popular classes to take a longer and moderate view. The development of a middle class is 
good for democracy because it tends to reward moderate and democratic parties, penalising 
extremist groups. This view was partly revived by Barro (1996, 1997, 1999), although 
subsequently Acemoglu et al. (2008) did not find evidence of the effect of economic growth 
on democracy. 
Inglehart and Welzel (2009) proposed a mechanism through which economic development 
can lead to democracy. Analysing the World Values Survey and the European Values Study, 
they found that “all the countries that experienced rising GDP per capita also experienced 
predictable shifts in their values”. Thus, beyond a certain threshold of economic development 
(or economic convergence), there are changes in behaviour and values that make democratic 
governance more likely to survive. It also brings structural changes through the development 
of a knowledge sector, which is useful for economic development and supports a rising 
educated and more self-concerned middle-class, which questions the legitimacy of an 
authoritarian system. 
Concerning the reverse effect of democracy on development (often proxied by economic 
growth), the literature has also not reached a consensus. Some have argued that a 
representative government may slow down economic growth. For example, elected 
politicians can run excessive deficits to favour re-election. Enabling competition for political 
influence may also lead to economic inefficiencies. Alesina and Rodrik (1994) and Persson 
and Tabellini (1994) suggested that high inequalities may increase the demand for 
redistribution and, under elections that favour the majority, the governments are likely to 
raise taxes, bringing down investment and growth. Through this channel, in democratic 
countries, inequalities may be detrimental for economic development. In contrast, other 
papers suggest that, even when democracies favour redistribution, it may still have a positive 
impact on development if public spending focuses on education (Saint-Paul and Verdier, 
1993; Bourguignon and Verdier, 2000) or addresses imperfections in capital market (Galor 
and Zeira, 1993). Democracies may also have lower political instability and lower output 
volatility which enables, in the long run, economic development. Olson (1993) argued that a 
lasting democracy provides security and contract rights that ultimately support growth. Sen 
(1999) supports the view that development goes with freedom, notably because democracies 
enable the gathering and transmitting of information.  
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Acemoglu et al. (2014) improved the empirical method to prove the causality of democracy 
on economic growth. They address the common problem of measurement error of political 
indicators by building a dichotomous index purged of spurious changes in democratic scores 
based on the previous work of Papaioannou and Siourounis (2008). They introduce country 
and time fixed effects to control for country and period characteristics that can potentially be 
correlated with democracy. They account for the dynamics of the democratic process, with a 
possible short-run negative impact of democracy impact of economic growth. Finally, they 
also use instrumental-variables to address any omitted variable bias.  
Other recent studies further improved the understanding of the interaction between economic 
liberalization and democratic governance and its impact on development. Persson and 
Tabellini (2006) show that if economic liberalisation happened before democratization then 
there is a positive impact on development while, if economic liberalization happens after 
democratization there is a negative impact on development. Cervellati, Naghavi and Toubal 
(2018) use a disaggregated measure of technology to avoid any reverse causality with 
economic liberalization and democratization. They show that the result of a positive impact 
of democracy on development, relies on country-specific characteristics and once adding time 
and country fixed effects, the cross-country correlation completely disappears. Murtin and 
Wacziarg (2014) showed that estimated effects of democracy on development depends on 
sample composition and time horizon. They conclude that it is the interaction between trade 
openness and democratization that lead to technological adoption and thus higher 
productivity and higher economic growth, underlying the need to look at the interactions 
between economic liberalization and democratization when analysing their impact on  
development.  
Lopez-Cordova and Meissner (2005) noted that that the existing literature has suffered from 
econometric problems that may explain the difficulty of reaching a consensus. In particular, 
endogeneity as well as the difficulties of finding valid instruments challenge a number of 
previous results. This problem applies to the analyses of the interactions between economic 
growth and democracy or globalization, although estimates of positive relationships were 
consistently found by Rodrik and Wacziarg (2005) and Acemoglu et al. (2015).  
To sum, while it is unclear which effect dominates the other, it is certain that economic 
development and democratic governance interact, as well as globalization and democratic 
governance and, globalization and economic development. In some sense there are multiple 
causes that can trigger a virtuous cycle between Globalization, Democratic governance and 
Development. They are heterogeneous and context-dependent and, that a vast literature has 
already been trying to answer the causality question.  
The research question addressed in this paper is not the causality among these variables, but 
the signs of their co-movements. In particular, if the all two-by-two interactions are positive, 
a mechanism triggering the increase in one of the variables may generate a virtuous cycle, 
and conversely. Analyzing the precise trigger mechanism or in which direction the causality 
flows is beyond the scope of this paper. Our aim is to assess the tripartite relationships among 
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the three variables and the of law of motion of the system. We believe that this analysis may 
be particularly relevant in the context of economic recovery from a series of large shocks, 
namely the one generated by the Covid-19 pandemic, that affected globalization trends, the 
level of political and civil freedoms, and economic convergence.   
Against this background, our approach naturally evolved towards the estimation of a 
simultaneous equation model representing the trivariate relationship between globalization, 
democratic governance and economic development. Indeed, under the assumption that these 
three variables interact with each other, treating them separately would induce endogeneity 
and/or omitted variable biases. 
The empirical estimation relies on an unbalanced heterogeneous panel with over 3700 
country-year observations. To capture a continuous and multi-dimensional measure of the 
Globalization process, we use the KOF index of Globalization (hereafter, labelled GLOB) put 
forward by Dreher (2006) and Dreher et al. (2008) using the 2017 version of the database. 
Contrary to simple trade openness ratios, the KOF index accounts both for different levels 
and types of globalization (economic, social and political). To capture economic 
development, we use the distance to US GDP per capita using data from the Penn World 
Tables (hereafter, CONV). Admittedly, this is a narrow definition of economic development, 
notably given the recent debate and efforts to go beyond GDP, and replace it by Well-Being 
measures. While this measurement agenda is very important, it has not yet produced 
sufficiently consistent datasets that can be used for a large panel data estimation.  
Democratic governance is best understood by looking at its constituent elements, possibly on 
a case-by-case basis, rather than by a binary variable, or even by a regime characterized 
exclusively by electoral competition and political participation. Thus, to extend the analysis 
of Eichengreen and Leblang (2008), who focused on a dichotomous nature of the democracy 
variable (including its age of democracy), possibly limiting the interpretation of the results, in 
this paper we employ a more detailed (and continuous) index based on civil and political 
freedoms. We averaged the index of political rights and civil liberties (hereafter, this variable 
is labelled FREE). These are de facto and continuous measures of democratic governance as 
opposed to the de jure and dichotomous ones that have been typically employed.  
Our results suggest the existence of strong two-way relationships between Globalization and 
Convergence, as well as, between Freedoms and Convergence. However, the positive 
interaction is driven by countries where inclusive institutions are the norm: globalization 
notwithstanding, relationships between Freedoms and Economic convergence are either non-
significant or negative outside of the OECD.  Thus, our findings suggest a self-reinforcing 
process led by the OECD group.2, The virtuous cycle breaks due to countries with the FREE 
                                               
2 It is worth recalling that national responses to interdependence, or mutual sensitivity tend to be defensive or 
exploitative rather than cooperative, so that even between two identical countries, the benefits of increased 
interdependence are more strongly felt at home than abroad, making each country dependent on the other’s 
expansion. Moreover, the symmetry in cyclical positions does not prevent an increase in the current account 
balance so that deficit countries face additional external vulnerability. The mutual interaction that Cooper (1968) 
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index around the sample mean.3 The relationship between FREE and CONV appears to be 
non-monotonic: positive between the values of 1 to 3 and above 4.5, negative in the middle 
(as a comparison the mean of the FREE indicator for OECD countries is around 6.7).  
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses the data. Section 3 
presents the empirical methodology, most notably a simultaneous system estimation of the 
reciprocal effects between our three variables of interest. Section 4 presents and discusses our 
main results together with some sensitivity and robustness checks. The last section concludes.  
2. Data  
2.2. Globalization 
To account for Globalization trends, we use the KOF index (Dreher, 2006; Dreher et al., 
2008) over the period 1970-2014, using the 2017 version of the database.4 This index offers a 
multi-dimensional and continuous measure of the globalization process for our sample of 
countries. It is probably closer to reality than measures focusing on only one dimension (e.g. 
trade openness). It actually includes three types of globalization. First, economic 
globalization accounts for actual flows (trade, foreign direct investments, and portfolio 
investments) and restrictions on trade and capital (hidden import barriers, mean tariff rare, 
taxes on international trade, and capital account restrictions). Second, political globalization 
is measured by the number of embassies, membership of international organizations, and 
participation in UN Security Council missions. Third, social globalization is decomposed into 
personal contact (tourism, foreign population, transfers), information flows (internet users, 
telephone mainlines, daily newspapers), and cultural proximity. The KOF index ranges from 
0-100, a higher score corresponding to a more “globalised” country.  
Box-plots for globalization, Freedoms and Convergence (available upon request) show, as 
one would expect, that the level of globalization, Freedoms and Convergene$ce are much 
higher and have lower dispersion in OECD countries than in non-OECD countries. 
2.1. Freedoms 
The measures of democratic governance commonly used in empirical research of the 
Globalization-Development nexus suffer from one notable limitation, namely the rudimentary 
manner in which democracy is usually conceptualized and measured, e.g. a regime 
characterized exclusively by electoral competition and political participation (Przeworski et 
al., 2000). Garoupa and Tavares (2009) show that higher income increases the survivability 
of democracy and a history of democratic instability, as well as the international political 
context, helps predict how regime transitions impact on democracy. However, they do not 
                                                                                                                                                  
analyzed in the North Atlantic security community was at the heart of complex interdependence, a form of 
international relations which spread to the founding members of the OECD and Japan. 
3 The FREE indicator varies between 1 and 7. The sample mean is around 4.6, which corresponds roughly to the 
level Philippines (see Summary statistics in the Appendix).  
4 Downloadable from the Swiss Federal Institute of Technology, Zurich: http://globalisation.kof.ethz.ch/ 
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pursue the definition of democracy per se, while Eichengreen and Leblang (2008) use a 
definition that is essentially de jure in nature, labelling a country as democratic if its 
governments are designated through competitive elections - elections in which more than one 
party competes and the winning party is not always the same, though they also use the 
number of years during which the system was in force. 
The use of a dichotomous variable prevents from identifying the effect of intermediate levels 
of democracy on development. The extension of suffrage, for example, would not appear in 
this dichotomous variable. Yet a negative interaction between democracy and debt default 
has been found for the period of the classical gold standard. Specifically, Flandreau and 
Zummer (2004, p. 44) find that the extension of suffrage reduces the default probability with 
an elasticity of 0.5 for the whole sample and of 1.3 for capital-poor countries. They note that 
contemporaries saw democracy and parliaments as a source of greater stability because they 
put checks and controls on the sovereign and imply a greater implied ability to tax. This 
contradicts the widespread view that the repression of democracy facilitated the operation of 
the pre-1914 international monetary system by making external adjustment easier. 
Some of these points also apply to the related literature attempting to find the nexus between 
democracy and growth. For example, Tavares and Wacziarg (2001) define democracy in 
purely procedural terms.5 As a result of this tendency to measure democracy in a purely 
political and formal manner, quantitative studies may misrepresent the effect of democracy 
on Globalization or misinterpret the aspect of democracy responsible for that effect. The 
concept of democratic capital proposed by Persson and Tabellini (2006, 2007, 2009), where 
own history of democracy and that of democratic capital accumulation among neighbouring 
countries help to determine the rate of economic growth, is another way of introducing 
quality considerations.6  
Against this background, our approach is that political rights and civil liberties are essential 
ingredients of democratic governance. First civil liberties (CL) include freedom of thought, 
religion, association, free press and respect for the rights of minorities. We derived these 
elements from the Freedom House Civil Liberties index, which is computed for almost all 
countries for the period 1972 onwards, using the 2017 version of the database. Second, 
political rights (PR) are associated with free and fair elections for the executive and 
legislative branches of power, freedom to constitute political parties, freedom of association, 
independence from political, religious and military authorities, real possibilities of the change 
of power and other related aspects of the political system. All of these and other features of 
political rights are taken into account by the Political Rights Index, which is published by 
                                               
5 Wanting to clearly distinguish democracy from other characteristics of political systems, they use the Freedom 
House indicator of political rights, based precisely on this procedural definition of democracy. They add that all 
previous studies focus on the direct effect of democracy on growth, conditional on other growth-determining 
factors and they question this procedure: “In theory, if a comprehensive institution such as democracy matters, it 
should matter indirectly through its effect on variables that in turn determine economic growth. Existing 
theoretical arguments point to links between democracy and a number of societal characteristics that influence 
growth. However, none of those arguments suggest that democracy has a direct impact on growth”. 
6 Eichengreen and Leblang (2008) used the age of democracy instead. Giuliano and Nunn (2013) showed the 
positive effect of democracy from the village to the Nation-state using Ancestral Characteristics Database.  
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Freedom House and covers the same period as that of the CL index.7  Both indexes are 
measured in the 1-7 scale, with 1 corresponding to high institutional quality and 7 
corresponding to low institutional quality. We used here the opposite so that high values 
represent high quality. Economic liberties are excluded from the simple average of CL and 
PR, because the multi-dimensional nature of the Globalization index features some of these 
economic liberties. Otherwise, the results would have been biased, displaying an automatic 
correlation between the two due to their common components. This problem, however, does 
not seem to concern the political rights and civil liberties indices. 
The choice of this indicator entails a trade-off, as our measure of democratic governance 
implies a smaller sample period (1972-2014) compared to that of Eichengreen and Leblang 
(2008), which covered the period 1870-2000. Although this might make the results more 
sensitive to sample bias (because the number of countries is much bigger than the number of 
years), the loss is not as large as might appear because of the missing values problem in the 
data.8  
2.3. Economic convergence 
The measure of economic Convergence is captured here by the distance to the income 
frontier, as the GDP per capita gap between each country and the US (ratio of the GDP pc of  
a given country to the GDP pc of the US, expressed in %). This measure is a rough way to 
measure convergence to the technological frontier. The latter is evident from the time 
averages of a heterogeneous sample of over 90 countries between 1970 and 2014 remain 
roughly constant (Figure 1).9 However, it may not suffer from the usual problems related to 
the use of GDP per capita levels, which may display common time trends with the 
globalization and democracy variables. This variable is derived from the Penn World Tables 
database version 9.0. It is measured at constant prices and, in order to obtain a consistent 
series, the data are PPP adjusted, using the GDP indicator “cgdpe”: expenditure-side real 
GDP at current PPPs (millions of 2011 US$).  
The list of countries together with summary statistics for the three variables of interest are 
presented in a table in the Appendix. The averages of the three variables over the country 
sample, together with the US GDP per capita, are displayed in Figure 1. The GLOB average  
shows a strong upward trend, especially after the early 90’s. The CONV average shows an 
acceleration in the turn of the XXIth century, then a relative stabilization. The FREE 
                                               
7 Downloadable from https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/freedom-world-2017 
8 The Eichengreen and Leblang sample covers 135 years for 202 countries (taking into account name and border 
changes) but no regression includes more than one third of the maximum number of observations (about 27K). 
Using our measures of Freedoms cuts the sample size by half rather than by two thirds. 
9 This is consistent with the idea of asymmetric growth (see Acemoglu et al., 2014), where some countries will 
opt for a type of capitalism that generates greater inequality and more innovation and will become the 
technology leaders, while others will free-ride on the cutthroat incentives of the leaders and choose more cuddly 
reward structures. In addition, “domestic constraints from social democratic parties or unions may be beneficial 
for a country because they prevent cutthroat capitalism domestically, instead inducing other countries to play 
this role”.  
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increased at much lower rates than the other two variables and remained relatively over the 
last decade of the sample.  
[Insert Figure 1] 
3. Empirical Method 
As discussed above, we rely on a simultaneous system of three equations, as follows: 
𝐺𝐿𝑂𝐵  = 𝛼 . 𝐹𝑅𝐸𝐸 +  𝛿 . 𝐶𝑂𝑁𝑉  + 𝛽 . 𝑍  + 𝜇 + 𝜌 + 𝜀
𝐹𝑅𝐸𝐸  = 𝛾 . 𝐺𝐿𝑂𝐵  +  𝛿 . 𝐶𝑂𝑁𝑉  + 𝛽 . 𝑍 + 𝜇 + 𝜌 + 𝜀
𝐶𝑂𝑁𝑉 = 𝛼 . 𝐹𝑅𝐸𝐸  + 𝛾 . 𝐺𝐿𝑂𝐵  + 𝛽 . 𝑍 + 𝜇 + 𝜌 + 𝜀
                  (1) 
for i = 1,…, N  and  t = 1970-2014 
where, for each country i, GLOB stands for the KOF index of Globalization. FREE is the 
Freedom House index variable averaging political rights (PR) and civil liberties (CL). CONV 
represents the ratio of a given country’s GDP per capita over that of the United States, while 
the vector 𝑍  denotes a set of appropriate control variables for each equation.10 µt , ρi  denote 
time and country effects, respectively. The former are included to control for global shocks, 
while the latter are included to control for unobserved cross-country heterogeneity. εit denotes 
the disturbance term satisfying usual assumptions of zero mean and constant variance; N is 
the total number of countries and t is time in years. 
In estimating a system of simultaneous equations, the question often arises whether to use 
two (2SLS) or three-stage least squares (3SLS). While 2SLS is computationally easier, the 
3SLS is known to be asymptotically more efficient, from exploiting non-zero cross-equation 
covariation (Belsey, 1988). Moreover, 3SLS can have greater small-sample efficiency than 
2SLS even when pairwise correlations are small. Since we expect a strong degree of 
intercorrelation among the errors of the different equations in our system, this increases the 
attractiveness of 3SLS. The 3SLS method uses all the information provided by the exogenous 
right-hand-side (RHS) variables to instrument the endogenous (LHS) left-hand-side 
variables.11 As such, it avoids the potential pitfall of having to find “good” instruments within 
a single equation context.  
In order to provide consistent estimates, the 3SLS method requires in each equation a set of 
exogenous variables specific to each endogenous variable. We took a model selection 
                                               
10 We followed Eichengreen and Leblang (2008) benchmark’s identification strategy very closely. Similarly to 
their study, we used a set of control variables for globalisation and Freedoms: the equation for globalisation 
includes size variables, (as larger countries tend to be less open to trade), a distance variable, regional dummies 
for Latin America, Middle-East, Africa and Asia, a variable equal to the number of currency crisis, and the rate 
of inflation; the equation for Freedoms includes regional dummies, a dummy for fuel exporters and a number of 
institutional controls: the number of prior transitions to dictatorship, the constitutional age, the number of other 
democracies in the global system, dummies for the socialist legal system, colonial heritage (British, French and 
Spanish), the percentage of the population living in urban areas and the population density. 
11 At the first stage, endogenous variables are instrumented by all exogenous variables in the system; at the 
second stage an efficient estimate for the covariance matrix of the disturbances is obtained; and at the final stage 
a GLS-type estimation uses this covariance matrix in a regression of the dependent variables on the 
instrumented values of endogenous variables and on the exogenous variables, with some identification 
restrictions. 
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approach of a large set of potential determinants of each of our main variables of interest, 
following the literature. To this end, we employed the widely used Bayesian Model 
Averaging (BMA) (Raftery, 1995) and the more recent Weighted-Average Least Squares 
(WALS) proposed by Magnus et al. (2010). Essentially BMA treats parameters and models 
as random variables and attempts to summarise the uncertainty about the model in terms of a 
probability distribution over the space of possible models. The WALS is claimed to be 
theoretically and practically superior to the BMA and presents two major advantages over it: 
its computational burden is trivial and it is based on a transparent definition of prior 
ignorance (Magnus et al., 2010). The full set of results are available upon request. This ex-
ante exercise allowed us to include in the vector of controls 𝑍 , the number of financial 
crises12 in the year in the Globalization equation, and the investment rate (approximated by 
capital formation13) in the Development equation. We also include dummy variables standing 
for legal and colonial origins14, as well as for fuel export dependence15, the number of 
democracies in the world16, population density, and a measure of urban population in the 
Freedoms equation. Other control variables, common to at least two equations, are also used. 
These include gravity controls (distance17, area, and population), inflation and regional 
dummies. We recognize that the 3SLS method may be more sensitive to the existence of 
spurious correlations or multi-collinearity among the regressors in one equation, thereby 
"contaminating" the remaining equations. Yet, this does not seem to be an issue in our 
sample. Since serial correlation can arise in this environment due to the presence of 
individual effects (Baltagi, 1980), each equation in system (1) is estimated with HAC robust 
standard errors clustered at the country level to allow us to make valid inferences. 
4. Empirical Results 
The cross-sectional nature of our panel is larger than the time series one (N=95 countries > 
T=43 years). Hence, we do not expect the time-series properties of the set of variables 
employed in our empirical exercise to give rise to potential spurious results. This being said, 
we still checked the panel stationary properties of our three main variables of interest.18 We 
carried out two different types of panel unit root tests: one first generation test, namely the 
Maddala and Wu (1999) test (MW), and one second generation test – the Pesaran (2007) 
CIPS test. The latter is associated with the fact that first-generation tests do not account for 
possible cross-sectional dependence of the contemporaneous error terms and failure to 
                                               
12 Data from Valencia and Laeven (2012), updated until 2014 
 https://www.imf.org/en/Publications/WP/Issues/2016/12/31/Systemic-Banking-Crises-Database-An-Update-
26015 
13 Using the “csh_i” indicator from the Penn World Tables 9.0 version 2017 which is the gross capital formation 
at current PPPs (% of “cgdpo”, Output-side real GDP at current PPPs (millions 2011 US$)) 
14 Of note, this dummy variable cover a set of countries and therefore can be jointly estimated with country 
dummies. The same applies for the regional dummies.  
15 From the WDI 2017 version, creating a dummy variable equals 1 if the % of oil in merchandise exports 
exceeds 50 (reference of the indicator: “TX.VAL.FUEL.ZS.UN”).  
16 Based on a dichotomous variable computed from polity2, a Polity IV Project’s indicator. 
17 The variable distance to the rest of the world, weighted by the % of trade with each trading partners comes 
from the computation of CEPII indicators http://www.cepii.fr/CEPII/fr/bdd_modele/presentation.asp?id=8  
18 The advantage of panel data integration is twofold: firstly, the tests are more powerful than the conventional 
ones: secondly, cross-section information reduces the probability of a spurious regression. 
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consider it may cause substantial size distortions in panel unit root tests (Pesaran, 2007). The 
results of the panel stationarity tests are omitted for reasons of parsimony but available upon 
request. In both tests the null hypothesis is that of non-stationarity of the variable. It appears 
that only the KOF globalisation index suffers from non-stationarity, which has the immediate 
implication that co-integration is not a problem in our setting. 
4.1 Baseline Results 
Tables 1, 2 and 3 display the results of estimating the system given by the system (1) for all 
the countries pooled together, for the OECD sub-sample, and for the non-OECD sub-sample, 
respectively. For the whole sample, we observe strong positive two-way effects between 
Freedoms and Globalization on the one hand, and between Globalization and Convergence 
on the other hand. The effect of Convergence on Freedoms is also positive and statistically 
significant at the 5% level, but Freedoms impact negatively on Convergence, at a 1% 
significance. The latter result is driven by the non-OECD group, where both Freedoms and 
Convergence interact negatively (Table 3).19 The case of China and, to some extent, Vietnam 
are examples of a development model where rapid economic convergence was not 
accompanied by a significant change of democratic governance, despite a possible positive 
between Globalisation and Freedoms.  
[Insert Tables 1, 2 and 3 here] 
As for the remaining regressors, we observe that fuel export dependence negatively affects 
the level of Freedoms, except for OECD countries since only Norway, from 1983 to 2014, 
has more than 50% of its merchandise exports made out of oil related products. This is 
typical in what Acemoglu and Robinson (2012) call extractive societies and is also related to 
Dutch disease type of effects. Such natural resources are predominantly located in developing 
countries whose quality of institutions is to some extent low and corruption high, rent seeking 
behaviours easily emerge. Inflation affects negatively Globalization and has positive impact 
on Convergence only for OECD countries. In line with the growth literature, investment 
matters for Convergence, as attested by the positive and statistically significant coefficient of 
the investment rate.  
Population affects positively Globalization, but has the reverse effect for Convergence. 
Interestingly, population density affects negatively Freedoms, but this effects is due to the 
non-OECD countries. This is probably due to lack of urban quality in some large non-OECD 
cities. However, increased urbanization seems to foster Freedoms in both OECD and non-
OECD countries. Other controls reflect the impact of history and geography. On historical 
and cultural aspects, the socialist legal origin affects negatively Freedoms, but within the 
OECD group the effect is positive, suggesting that former socialists when provided with a 
strong policy anchor (for example, the process of EU accession) can overcome past legacies. 
In contrast, the English colony dummy is uniformly positive in all samples. the Spanish 
                                               
19 Of note, the results already found in Braga de Macedo et al. (2013) on a negative relationship between 
Freedoms and Convergence for non-OECD countries are confirmed with our enlarged dataset.  
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colony dummy is never significant. Unlike the English and Spanish colony dummies, the 
socialist legal origin negatively affects Freedoms (a summary of these relations is provided in 
Figure 2).20 The geography dummies (in particular the Middle East one) tend to show a 
negative effect on Globalization and Freedoms for the sample of non-OECD countries. 
Distant countries tend to be less globalized, but this geographic factor does not seem to 
hinder convergence forces. 
Table 4 provides the calculated cross-elasticities for Globalization, Freedoms and 
Convergence derived from the estimates for a country presenting mean values of these three 
variables.21 In the full sample (Panel A), the largest effect is the impact of Globalization on 
Convergence (+1.9). For OECD, the largest effect is found for Freedoms on Convergence, 
while for the non-OECD group the impact of Globalization on Convergence is the most 
important.   
As an illustration, an increase in the Globalization index from the non-OECD mean (around 
43, cf. Appendix) to the sample mean (around 51, or an increase factor of around 20%) would 
narrow the distance to the frontier in the non-OECD group from 17.1% to around 57% of the 
US GDP pc, i.e. would more than triple. This result is obtained, ceteris paribus, keeping the 
other variables constant. Reflecting the simultaneity relations, if one takes into account 
second and above order effects could actually produce even higher values.  
 
[Insert Table 4 here] 
Looking at the mean effects, for OECD countries (Panel B), the positive two-way 
relationships between Freedoms and Globalization, as well as between Freedoms and 
Convergence, remain. In particular, the latter effect is much stronger. In contrast, 
Globalization has a much smaller effect on the reduction of the income gap. For non-OECD 
countries (Panel C), the elasticity of Globalization with respect to Convergence is 50% higher 
as for the full sample (1.91 vs. 2.81). However, the interaction between Freedoms and 
Convergence changes dramatically: the impact of Freedoms on Convergence becomes 
negative, and there is a very small negative effect of Convergence on Freedoms. 
4.2 Robustness checks 
As a robustness check, we re-estimated our system (1) using the SURE method with an 
iteration procedure over the estimated disturbance covariance matrix and parameter estimates 
that converge to stable maximum likelihood results (Zellner, 1962, 1963; Zellner and Huang, 
                                               
20 In a complementary explanation of the democracy-globalization interaction, Braga de Macedo (2014) 
discusses how the diversity, be it socio-cultural or economic, is addressed by a given society. This diversity 
depends to the ability to build inclusive institutions and is at the heart of “why nations fail”, borrowing the title 
of Acemoglu and Robinson (2012). Nevertheless, it goes beyond the asymmetric growth mentioned above in the 
text following Acemoglu et al (2014). 
21 While computed elasticities for the effects of Globalization, Freedoms and Convergence, are based on mean 
values of the full sample, including the OECD and non-OECD samples, it may masks disparities within 
samples, our results are robust to the exclusion of outliers. Using the Least Absolute Deviation approach prior to 
the 3SLS estimation to remove potential outliers yields qualitatively the same results. 
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1962).22 Summary results for the three main variables of interest are displayed in Table 5. For 
the OECD sub-sample results are qualitatively unchanged compared to those in Table 2. 
However, for the whole sample, we no longer see a significantly negative coefficient running 
from Freedoms to Convergence, as in Table 1. For non-OECD countries, the negative effect 
of Freedoms on Convergence though remains. 
 
[Insert Table 5 here] 
 
Given the key role of Globalization in the positive dynamics in the system, to further test the 
robustness of our results we decompose the Globalization index into its components as 
discussed in Section 2. We therefore run our system (1) with 3SLS for each of the three main 
components of the total index: i) Economic Globalization; ii) Social Globalization; and iii) 
Political Globalization.  
We begin with the full sample, whose results for the three main variables of concern are 
displayed in Table 6, Panel A.23 The negative effect of  Freedoms on Convergence seems to 
driven by the interaction with Social Globalization, while with Economic or Political 
Globalization only, we get a positive and statistically significant effect of Freedoms on 
Convergence. Also, when considering Social Globalization, the positive effect of 
Convergence on Freedoms becomes non-significant. For OECD countries only (Table 6, 
Panel B) irrespectively of the type of Globalization most results hold, as in Table 2. The only 
exception is that we do get a negative and statistically significant coefficient running from 
Convergence to Globalization when the Political dimension is considered in isolation. This 
perhaps can be interpreted as the need to have a comprehensive approach to Globalization, 
rather than focusing only on political aspects.  
For non-OECD countries (Table 6, Panel C), all the components are driving the negative 
impact of Convergence on Freedoms. When Political Globalization is considered only, we get 
the result that as countries become closer to the frontier, that contributes positively to the 
democratic governance process.24   
These sensitivity results show that our baseline estimates seem relatively robust, but the 
complex simultaneity relationships among the three variables can be sensitive to estimation 
method and definition of the type of Globalization index chosen.  
 
[Insert Table 6 here] 
                                               
22 In the classical linear SURE model, one usually assumes that the errors are i.i.d. over time with mean zero and 
homoscedastic variance '( | )it itE X   (with X being the vector of regressors). Furthermore,  is assumed 
to be positive definite. As in standard univariate models, non-spherical disturbances can be accommodated by 
either modelling the residuals or computing robust covariance matrices. 
23 To economize on space, the coefficient estimates on other regressors have been omitted from Table 5, but 
they are available from the authors upon request. Overall, the sign, statistical significance and economic 
interpretation do not qualitatively change throughout the different exercises conducted. 
24 See Huang (2006) for a model suggesting a long-run relationship between economic development and 
political development based on the inherent technical features of different production factors. 
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5. Summing-up and conclusions 
 
In this paper, we analysed simultaneously the interactions between Globalization, Freedoms 
and Convergence for a sample of 95 countries over the period 1972-2014.  Our starting point 
was the two-way robust relation between Democracy and Globalization found in Eichengreen 
and Leblang (2008). We extended their analysis by using multi-dimensional and continuous 
measures of democratic governance (Civil and Political Freedoms) and Globalization, as well 
as integrating the relationships between these two variables and the income gap relative to the 
US, as a measure of economic convergence. 
The sample average evolution of these three variables shows a striking contrast between 
Freedoms, Globalization, on the one hand, and Convergence, on the other hand (recall 
Figure 1). Democratic freedoms rose steadily since they were first measured in the 1970s. 
Globalization also increases with an acceleration after the collapse of the Soviet Union in the 
1990s. But the average level of Development measured by the average income gap, remains 
stable throughout the period. Of course, this relative stagnation still implies an increase in the 
absolute levels of GDP per capita, as shown by the steady increase in the world’s 
technological frontier (GDP per capita in the US).  
 
Two main results of our work ought to be highlighted. When separated into two groups, 
clearly distinct patterns emerge for OECD and non-OECD countries. Introducing the income 
gap as a third endogenous variable confirms the two-way interaction between Freedoms and 
Globalization found in Eichengreen and Leblang (2008), both for OECD and non-OECD 
countries. Globalization displays significant positive effects on both Freedoms and 
Convergence in non-OECD countries. Our analysis, however, indicates a significant negative 
impact of Freedoms on Convergence in non-OECD group. This may reflect the hypothesis 
that Globalization’s effects on Freedoms are mediated by slow-moving cultural values, 
probably leading to a dynamic asymmetry between Globalization and Freedoms, moderated 
by the stage of economic and institutional development.25  
On the basis of these results, the positive systemic effect among Globalization, Freedoms and 
Convergence can be put into question by the recent negative shocks on Globalization and 
Freedoms related to the Covid-19 pandemic and previous shocks. Further work is, 
nevertheless, needed to better understand the long-run dynamics and sustainability of this 
global system, in particular, the mechanisms that could enforce or reinforce the expected 
positive effect of Globalization on both economic Convergence and Freedoms.  
  
                                               
25 Perhaps an interesting perspective could be to think in terms of the sequence between Freedoms and economic 
growth (or convergence). An early development of a strong, modern state may lay the foundations for economic 
development, but may also hurt the long-term consolidation of democratic governance (Germany and Japan are 
examples in the XXth century). 
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Figure 1: Country-time Average of GLOB, FREE and CONV  
 
 
Notes: GLOB is the KOF Globalization index; FREE is the average of political and civil rights; CONV is the ratio between 
GDP per capita in each country vis-à-vis the US (in %); and GDP pc US is the level of GDP per capita in the US (as a proxy 
of the income frontier). All variables are expressed as an index with 1972=100. 























































































Table 1: Baseline specification System Three Stage Least Squares, all countries 
 
Specification (1) (2) (3) 
COEFFICIENT Globalization Freedoms Convergence 
    
Globalization  0.0382*** 1.1388*** 
  (0.002) (0.022) 
Freedoms 5.2819***  -1.2223*** 
 (0.161)  (0.285) 
Convergence 0.4525*** 0.0032**  
 (0.009) (0.001)  
Lagged number of transitions to democracy  0.3740***  
  (0.029)  
Lagged constitutional age  0.0255***  
  (0.002)  
Lagged total number of democracies  -0.0033***  
  (0.001)  
Lagged fuel export dependence  -0.4362***  
  (0.064)  
Socialist legal origin  -0.6876***  
  (0.081)  
English colony  0.4215***  
  (0.046)  
French colony  -0.1697**  
  (0.068)  
Spanish colony  0.0363  
  (0.066)  
Lagged urban population  0.0078***  
  (0.001)  
Lagged population density  -0.0002***  
  (0.000)  
Latin America 10.4120*** -0.3408*** -27.2957*** 
 (0.732) (0.086) (1.041) 
Middle East 6.7291*** -1.5868*** -4.6207*** 
 (0.893) (0.089) (1.419) 
Africa 11.7434*** -1.0769*** -24.6042*** 
 (0.851) (0.093) (1.265) 
Asia 8.7773*** -0.7500*** -19.9558*** 
 (0.916) (0.085) (1.441) 
Lagged total financial crises -0.0906***   
 (0.025)   
Lagged inflation -0.0004  0.0002 
 (0.000)  (0.001) 
Log distance from the rest of the world -6.2728***  10.3365*** 
 (0.431)  (0.717) 
Log area -0.5443***  0.5784** 
 (0.136)  (0.226) 
Log population 1.9671***  -3.3153*** 
 (0.174)  (0.296) 
Investment rate   26.7893*** 
   (2.825) 
Constant 61.3379*** 2.4727*** -98.5700*** 
 (3.381) (0.107) (5.781) 
Observations 3,773 3,773 3,773 
R-squared 0.6192 0.6539 0.6737 
Note: The system is estimated by three-stage least squares. Time and countries dummies are included but not 
presented for reasons of parsimony. Heteroskedastic-consistent standard errors are in parentheses. ***, ** and * 




Table 2: Baseline specification System Three Stage Least Squares, OECD countries 
 
Specification (1) (2) (3) 
COEFFICIENT Globalization Freedoms Convergence 
    
Globalization  0.0280*** 0.5674*** 
  (0.002) (0.055) 
Freedoms 11.6373***  16.4318*** 
 (0.699)  (1.137) 
Convergence 0.0998*** 0.0141***  
 (0.019) (0.001)  
Lagged number of transitions to democracy  -0.1640***  
  (0.040)  
Lagged constitutional age  -0.0019  
  (0.002)  
Lagged total number of democracies  -0.0008  
  (0.001)  
Lagged fuel export dependence  0.0525  
  (0.066)  
Socialist legal origin  0.2322***  
  (0.078)  
English colony  0.1283***  
  (0.041)  
Spanish colony  0.0423  
  (0.090)  
Lagged urban population  0.0058***  
  (0.001)  
Lagged population density  -0.0001  
  (0.000)  
Latin America 5.9879*** -0.2136 -10.8138*** 
 (2.152) (0.148) (3.372) 
Middle East 6.0879 -0.3278 -3.6675 
 (4.599) (0.254) (7.317) 
Asia -3.7646 0.1804 -7.5481* 
 (2.452) (0.153) (3.957) 
Lagged total financial crises -0.0786   
 (0.050)   
Lagged inflation -0.1666***  0.1931*** 
 (0.032)  (0.053) 
Log distance from the rest of the world -6.2453***  6.8151*** 
 (0.696)  (1.168) 
Log area -0.3967  0.2447 
 (0.258)  (0.413) 
Log population 1.4396***  -0.7416* 
 (0.262)  (0.431) 
Investment rate   86.1708*** 
   (9.194) 
Constant 42.5190*** 3.2734*** -162.9118*** 
 (6.105) (0.161) (10.852) 
Observations 1,021 1,021 1,021 
R-squared 0.3903 0.4220 0.4054 
Note: The system is estimated by three-stage least squares. Time and countries dummies are included but not presented 
for reasons of parsimony. Heteroskedastic-consistent standard errors are in parentheses. ***, ** and * denote significant 




Table 3: Baseline specification System Three Stage Least Squares, non-OECD countries 
 
Specification (1) (2) (3) 
COEFFICIENT Globalization Freedoms Convergence 
    
Globalization  0.0388*** 1.0825*** 
  (0.003) (0.024) 
Freedoms 4.9847***  -4.0641*** 
 (0.175)  (0.276) 
Convergence 0.5519*** -0.0058***  
 (0.012) (0.002)  
Lagged number of transitions to democracy  0.5167***  
  (0.036)  
Lagged constitutional age  0.0499***  
  (0.003)  
Lagged total number of democracies  -0.0027*  
  (0.001)  
Lagged fuel export dependence  -0.5084***  
  (0.083)  
Socialist legal origin  -1.2001***  
  (0.143)  
English colony  0.4241***  
  (0.071)  
French colony  -0.1888**  
  (0.085)  
Spanish colony  -0.0666  
  (0.084)  
Lagged urban population  0.0071***  
  (0.002)  
Lagged population density  -0.0002***  
  (0.000)  
Latin America 0.5222 -0.6627*** -5.6053*** 
 (1.083) (0.155) (1.557) 
Middle East -5.6110*** -1.5136*** 13.2700*** 
 (1.197) (0.158) (1.702) 
Africa 2.1973* -1.3464*** -8.3420*** 
 (1.126) (0.156) (1.619) 
Asia -1.3291 -1.0177*** -2.1775 
 (1.267) (0.146) (1.889) 
Lagged total financial crises -0.1240***   
 (0.031)   
Lagged inflation -0.0005  0.0005 
 (0.000)  (0.001) 
Log distance from the rest of the world -4.9008***  8.4924*** 
 (0.563)  (0.843) 
Log area 0.0909  -0.7287*** 
 (0.175)  (0.262) 
Log population 1.9957***  -2.9045*** 
 (0.243)  (0.371) 
Investment rate   18.8558*** 
   (2.916) 
Constant 51.2898*** 2.7195*** -70.8752*** 
 (4.469) (0.173) (6.844) 
Observations 2,752 2,752 2,752 
R-squared 0.2865 0.4823 0.3934 
Note: The system is estimated by three-stage least squares. Time and countries dummies are included but not 
presented for reasons of parsimony. Heteroskedastic-consistent standard errors are in parentheses. ***, ** and * 




Table 4. Estimated cross-elasticities, baseline specification 
 
Countries Panel A: All countries 
Impact of row on column  Globalization Freedoms Convergence 
Globalization -- 0.42 1.91 
Freedoms 0.48 -- -0.19 
Convergence 0.27 0.02 -- 
Countries Panel B: OECD countries 
Impact of row on column  Globalization Freedoms Convergence 
Globalization -- 0.31 0.61 
Freedoms 1.05 -- 1.60 
Convergence 0.09 0.14 -- 
Countries Panel C: Non-OECD countries 
Impact of row on column  Globalization Freedoms Convergence 
Globalization -- 0.43 2.81 
Freedoms 0.45 -- -0.95 




Table 5: System Three Stage Least Squares SURE estimation  
A. All countries    





Globalization  0.0321*** 1.0431*** 
  (0.002) (0.021) 
Freedoms 4.2185***  0.0641 
 (0.132)  (0.226) 
Convergence 0.4220*** 0.0062***  
 (0.008) (0.001)  






Globalization  0.0261*** 0.7429*** 
  (0.002) (0.051) 
Freedoms 8.2812***  11.7841*** 
 (0.555)  (0.893) 
Convergence 0.1749*** 0.0117***  
 (0.017) (0.001)  






Globalization  0.0306*** 0.9174*** 
  (0.003) (0.024) 
Freedoms 3.8271***  -1.9689*** 
 (0.142)  (0.219) 
Convergence 0.4641*** 0.0005  
 (0.011) (0.002)  
Note: Each block of results correspond to the system (1) estimated by three-stage least squares seemingly unrelated 
regression (SURE) with iteratively convergence to ML estimates, as in Table 1-3 for the full sample, OECD and non-OECD 
(blocks A, B and C, respectively). Other regressors’ coefficient estimates are available upon request. Time and countries 
dummies are included but not presented for reasons of parsimony. Heteroskedastic-consistent standard errors are in 




Table 6: System Three Stage Least Squares estimation by type of Globalization 
 
A. All countries 
Variables 
(Table 1) 




Glob Total  0.0382*** 1.1388*** Glob Econ  0.0286*** 0.8312*** 
  (0.002) (0.022)   (0.002) (0.020) 
Freedoms 5.2819***  -1.2223*** Freedoms 5.6493***  0.7087** 
 (0.161)  (0.285)  (0.205)  (0.287) 
Convergence 0.4525*** 0.0032**  Convergence 0.5028*** 0.0071***  
 (0.009) (0.001)   (0.011) (0.001)  
        
Variables Globalization 
Social 




Glob Social  0.0307*** 1.1449*** Glob Polit  0.0158*** 0.5175*** 
  (0.002) (0.018)   (0.001) (0.025) 
Freedoms 4.3115***  -1.2610*** Freedoms 6.2054***  3.3896*** 
 (0.179)  (0.264)  (0.200)  (0.309) 
Convergence 0.6025*** 0.0004  Convergence 0.2048*** 0.0199***  
 (0.009) (0.001)   (0.012) (0.001)  
 
B. OECD countries 
Variables 
(Table 2) 




Glob Total  0.0280*** 0.5674*** Glob Econ  0.0238*** 0.4176*** 
  (0.002) (0.055)   (0.002) (0.048) 
Freedoms 11.6373***  16.4318*** Freedoms 12.6103***  18.3235*** 
 (0.699)  (1.137)  (0.831)  (1.127) 
Convergence 0.0998*** 0.0141***  Convergence 0.0954*** 0.0149***  
 (0.019) (0.001)   (0.023) (0.001)  
        
Variables Globalization 
Social 




Glob Social  0.0233*** 0.5810*** Glob Polit  0.0150*** 0.0657 
  (0.002) (0.042)   (0.002) (0.067) 
Freedoms 12.9678***  14.7951*** Freedoms 10.0070***  23.8042*** 
 (0.884)  (1.123)  (0.676)  (1.091) 
Convergence 0.2139*** 0.0118***  Convergence -0.0528*** 0.0204***  
 (0.024) (0.001)   (0.018) (0.001)  
 
C. Non-OECD countries 
Variables 





Glob Total  0.0388*** 1.0825*** Glob Econ  0.0286*** 0.8093*** 
  (0.003) (0.024)   (0.002) (0.021) 
Freedoms 4.9847***  -4.0641*** Freedoms 5.5966***  -3.1374*** 
 (0.175)  (0.276)  (0.225)  (0.278) 
Convergence 0.5519*** -0.0058***  Convergence 0.6542*** -0.0060***  
 (0.012) (0.002)   (0.015) (0.002)  
        
Variables Globalization 
Social 




Glob Social  0.0375*** 1.1747*** Glob Pol  0.0104*** 0.4564*** 
  (0.003) (0.021)   (0.002) (0.025) 
Freedoms 3.8627***  -3.5351*** Freedoms 5.8243***  -1.5033*** 
 (0.180)  (0.255)  (0.229)  (0.301) 
Convergence 0.6680*** -0.0114***  Convergence 0.2894*** 0.0092***  
 (0.011) (0.002)   (0.017) (0.002)  
Note: Each of the four blocks of results correspond to the system (1) estimated by three-stage least squares as in Table 1-3 for: 
the KOF composite index (repeated top left for convenience), Economic Globalization (top right), Social Globalization 
(bottom left) and Political Globalization (bottom right). Other regressors’ coefficient estimates are available upon request. 
Time and countries dummies are included but not presented for reasons of parsimony. Heteroskedastic-consistent standard 




List of countries 
Albania, Algeria, Argentina, Bangladesh, Benin, Bolivia, Botswana, Brazil, Bulgaria, Burundi, Cameroon, 
Central African Republic, Chad, China, Colombia, Costa Rica, Cyprus, Dominican Rep., Ecuador, Egypt, El 
Salvador, Ghana, Guatemala, Haiti, India, Indonesia, Iran, Ivory Coast, Jamaica, Jordan, Kenya, Kuwait, 
Madagascar, Malawi, Malaysia, Mali, Malta, Morocco, Nepal, Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, Oman, Pakistan, 
Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Romania, Rwanda, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Sri Lanka, 
Tanzania, Thailand, Togo, Tunisia, Uganda, Uruguay, Venezuela, Zambia, Zimbabwe. 29 OECD (non-founders 
membership: * after 2005; ** during 10 years; *** during 12 years): Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, 
Chile*, Denmark, Finland, France, Greece, Hungary**, Iceland, Ireland, Israel*, Italy, Japan, Korea**, 
Luxembourg, Mexico***, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Poland**, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, 
Switzerland, Turkey, United Kingdom, United States: 
 
 
Summary statistics of three key variables of interest: GLOB, FREE and CONV  
All countries 
Variable Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
      
Globalization (KOF) 4198 50.99 19.67 11.55 92.83 
Freedoms 4230 4.62 1.92 1 8 
Convergence 4247 31.5 32.5 0.9 267.6 
OECD Countries 
Variable Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
      
Globalization (KOF) 1144 72.82 13.61 31.19 92.83 
Freedoms 1135 6.67 0.73 2 7 
Convergence 1144 70.7 23.8 21.2 181.3 
Non-OECD Countries 
Variable Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
      
Globalization (KOF) 3054 42.83 14.76 11.55 88.27 
Freedoms 3095 3.87 1.66 1 8 
Convergence 3103 17.1 21.6 0.9 267.6 
 
 
